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We introduce and study a simple model of a limit order-driven market. Traders in this model
can either trade at the market price or place a limit order, i.e. an instruction to buy (sell) a
certain amount of the stock if its price falls below (raises above) a predefined level. The choice
between these two options is purely random (there are no strategies involved), and the execution
price of a limit order is determined simply by offsetting the most recent market price by a random
amount. Numerical simulations of this model revealed that despite such minimalistic rules the price
pattern generated by the model has such realistic features as “fat” tails of the price fluctuations
distribution, characterized by a crossover between two power law exponents, long range correlations
of the volatility, and a non-trivial Hurst exponent of the price signal.
Recent years have witnessed an explosion of activity in
the area of statistical analysis of high-frequency financial
time series [1]. This lead to the discovery of robust and to
a certain degree universal features of price fluctuations,
and triggered theoretical studies aimed at explaining or
simply mimicking these observations. The list of empir-
ical facts that need to be addressed by any successful
theory or model is:
(i) The histogram of short time-lag increments of mar-
ket price has a very peculiar non-Gaussian shape with
a sharp maximum and broad wings [2]. The current
consensus about the functional form of this distribu-
tion is that up to a certain point it follows a Pareto-
Levy distribution, with the exponent of its power law
tail 1 + α1 ∼ 2.4 − 2.7, after which it crosses over to a
steeper power law 1+α2 ∼ 4− 4.5 [3], or, as reported in
another study [4,5], to an exponential decay.
(ii) When viewed on time scales less than several trad-
ing days, the graph of price vs time appears to have a
Hurst exponent H ≃ 0.6 − 0.7 [2,5], different from an
ordinary uncorrelated random walk value HRW = 0.5.
(iii) The volatility (the second moment of price fluctu-
ations) exhibits correlated behavior. It is manifested in
clustering of volatility, i.e. the presence of regions of un-
usually high amplitude of fluctuations separated by rel-
atively quiet intervals, visible with a “naked eye” in the
graph of price increment vs time. These clustering effects
determine the shape of the autocorrelation function of
volatility as a function of time, which was shown to decay
as a power law with a very small exponent γ ≃ 0.3− 0.4
and no apparent cutoff [4,6].
There are several approaches to modeling market me-
chanics. In one type of models price fluctuations result
from trading activity of conscious agents, whose deci-
sions to buy or sell are dictated by well defined strate-
gies. These strategies evolve in time (often according to
some Darwinian rules) and give rise to a slowly changing
fluctuation pattern. There is little doubt that the evo-
lution and dynamics of investor’s strategies and beliefs
influence the long term behavior of real market prices.
For example, if some company could not keep up with
the competition, sooner or later investors would realize
it, and in the long-term its stock price would go down.
However, it is unclear how does it influence the properties
of stock price fluctuations at very short timescales, which
do not allow time for traders to update their strategies
or for a company to change its profile. Another problem
with models explaining short time price fluctuations in
terms of strategy evolution is that they inevitably lead
their creators to shaky grounds of speculations about rel-
evant and irrelevant psychological motivations of a “typ-
ical” trader in a highly heterogeneous trader population.
The remarkable universality of general features of price
fluctuations in markets of different types of risky assets
such as stocks, options, foreign currency, and commodi-
ties (say, cotton or oil) makes one to suspect that in fact
psychological factors play little role in determining their
short time properties, and leads one to try to look for a
simpler mechanisms giving rise to these features.
In this work we do a first step in this direction by
introducing and numerically studying a simple market
model, where a nontrivial price pattern arises not due
to the evolution of trading strategies, but rather as a
consequence of trading rules themselves. Before we pro-
ceed with formulating the rules of our model we need to
define several common market terms. A market trader
is usually allowed to place a so-called “limit order to
sell (buy)”, which is an instruction to automatically sell
(buy) a particular amount of stock if its market price
would raise higher (or drop lower for a limit buy or-
der) than the predetermined threshold. This threshold is
sometimes referred to as the execution price of the limit
order. In many modern markets, known to economists
as order-driven markets [7], limit orders placed by ordi-
nary traders constitute the major source of the liquidity
of the market. It means that a request to immediately
buy or sell a particular amount of stock at the best mar-
ket price, or “market order”, is filled by matching it to
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the best unsatisfied limit order in the limit order book.
To better understand how transactions are made at an
order-driven market it is better to consider the follow-
ing simple example: suppose one trader (trader #1) has
submitted a limit order to sell 1000 shares of the stock
of a company X, provided that its price would exceed
$20/share. Subsequently another trader (trader #2) has
submitted a limit order to sell 2000 shares of X if the
price would exceed $21/share. Finally, a third trader de-
cides to buy 2000 shares of X at the market price. In
the absence of other limit orders his order will be filled
as follows: he will buy 1000 shares from trader #1 at
$20/share and 1000 shares from trader #2 at $21/share.
After this transaction the limit order book would contain
only one partially filled limit order to sell, that of trader
#2 to sell 1000 shares of X at $21/share.
Traders in our model can either trade stock at the mar-
ket price or place a limit order to sell or buy. To simplify
the rules of our toy market, traders are allowed to trade
only one unit (lot) of stock in each transaction. That
makes all limit and market orders to be of the same size.
The empirical study of limit-order trading at the ASX
[7] can be used to partially justify this simplification. In
this work it was observed that limit orders mostly come
in sizes given by round numbers such as 1000 shares and
(to a lesser extent) 10000 shares. Unlike many other mar-
ket models, we do not fix the number of traders. Instead,
at each time step a “new” trader appears out of a “trader
pool” and attempts to make a transaction. With equal
probabilities this new trader is a seller or a buyer. He
then performs one of the following two actions:
• with probability qlo he places a limit order to
sell/buy.
• otherwise (with probability 1− qlo) he trades (sells
or buys) at the market price.
The rule of execution of a market order in our model
is particularly simple. Since all orders are of the same
size, a market order is simply filled with the best limit
order (i.e. the highest bid among limit orders to buy
and the lowest ask among limit orders to sell), which is
subsequently removed from the limit order book. This
transaction performed at the execution price of the best
limit order sets a new value of the market price p(t).
To complete the definition of the rules one needs to
specify how a trader who selected to place a new limit
order decides on its execution price. Traders in our model
do this in a very “non-strategic” way by simply offsetting
the price of the last transaction performed on the mar-
ket (current market price p(t)), by a random number ∆.
This positive random number is drawn each time from the
same probability distribution P (∆). A new limit order
to sell is placed above the current price at p(t)+∆, while
a new limit order to buy – below it at p(t)−∆. This way
ranges of limit orders to sell and to buy never overlap,
i.e. there is always a positive gap between highest bid
and lowest ask prices. This “random offset” rule con-
stitutes a reasonable first order approximation to what
may happen in real order-driven markets and is open to
modifications if it fail a reality check. The most obvious
variants of this rule, which we plan to study in the near
future, are i) A model where each trader has his indi-
vidual distribution P (∆). This modification would allow
for the coexistence of “patient” traders who do not care
very much about when their order will be executed or if
it will be executed at all, and can therefore select large ∆
and pocket the difference, and “impatient” traders who
need their order to be executed soon, so they tend to se-
lect a small ∆ or trade at the market price. ii) A model
in which the probability distribution of ∆ is determined
by the historic volatility of the market. This rule seems
to be particularly reasonable description of a real order-
driven market. Indeed, if traders selection of ∆ is in-
fluenced primarily by his desire to reduce waiting time
before his order is executed, then it would make sense
to select a larger ∆ in a more volatile market, which is
likely to cover larger price interval during the same time
interval. However, before any of these more complicated
versions of this rule could be explored one needs to study
and understand the behavior of the base model, where
∆ is just a random number, uncorrelated with volatility
and/or the individual trader profile.
One should notice that the behavior of traders in our
model is completely passive and “mechanical”: once a
limit order is placed it cannot be removed or shifted
in response to a current market situation. This makes
our rules fundamentally different from these of the Bak-
Paczuski-Shubik (BPS) model [8], where randomly in-
creases or decreases their quotes at each time step. Such
haphazard trader behavior cannot be realized in an order-
driven market, where each change of the limit-order exe-
cution price carries a fee.
We have simulated our model with qlo = 1/2, i.e. when
on average half of the traders select to place limit orders,
while the other half trade at the market price. The ran-
dom number ∆, used in setting an execution price of a
new limit order, was drawn from a uniform distribution
in the interval 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆max = 4. Obviously, price pat-
terns in models with different values of ∆max are identical
up to an overall rescaling factor. Our choice of ∆max = 4
was dictated by the desire to compare the behavior of
the model with continuous spectrum of ∆ to that with
a discrete spectrum ∆ = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Discrete spectrum
of ∆ may better compare to the behavior of real mar-
kets, where all prices are multiples of a unit tick size.
Our comparison confirmed that most scaling properties
of the price pattern are the same in both variants. We
were surprised to notice that non-trivial features of our
model survived even in a model with deterministic ∆ = 1.
To improve the speed of numerical simulations we stud-
ied a version of the model, where only 217 lowest ask and
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highest bid quotes were retained. The list of quotes was
kept ordered at all times, which accelerated the search
for the highest bid and lowest ask limit orders whenever
a transaction at the market price was requested. We also
studied a variant of our model where each limit order had
an expiration time: if a limit order was not filled within
1000 time steps it was removed from the list. Not only
this rule prevented an occasional accumulation of a very
long list of limit orders, but also it made sense in terms of
how limit orders are organized in a real market. Indeed,
limit orders at, for example, New York Stock Exchange
are usually valid only during the trading day when they
were submitted. There are also so called “good till can-
celed” (or open) orders, which are valid until they are ex-
ecuted or withdrawn [9]. Then the version of our model,
where the expiration time of a limit order is not speci-
fied corresponds to all orders being “good till canceled”,
while the version, where only the most recent orders are
kept, mimics the market composed of only “day orders”.
We have checked that for any reasonably large value of
the cutoff parameter, no matter if it is an expiration time
or the number of best sell/buy orders to keep, one ends
up with the same scaling properties of price fluctuations.
In Fig. 1 we present an example of price history in one
of the runs of our model. Visually it is clear that this
graph is quite different from an ordinary random walk.
This impression is confirmed by looking at the pattern
of price increments p(t + 1) − p(t), shown in the same
figure. One can see that large increments are clustered
in regions of high volatility, separated by relatively quite
intervals. The Fourier spectrum of the price signal av-
eraged over many runs of the models provides us with a
value of the Hurst exponentH of the price graph. Indeed,
the exponent of the Fourier transform of price autocorre-
lation function Sp(f) is related to the Hurst exponent as
Sp(f) ∼ f
−(1+2H). The log-log plot of Sp(f), logarith-
mically binned and averaged over multiple realizations of
the price signal of length 218, is shown in the inset to Fig.
1. It has an exceptionally clean f−3/2 functional form for
over 5 decades in f , which corresponds to the Hurst ex-
ponent of the price signal H = 1/4. This exponent is def-
initely different from its random walk value HRW = 1/2.
A Hurst exponentH = 1/4 was also observed in the Bak-
Paczuski-Shubik model A [8,10]. An intuitive argument
in favor of a small Hurst exponent can be constructed
for our model. According to the rules of the model an
execution price of a new limit order is always determined
relative to the current price. It is also clear that a large
density of limit orders around current price position re-
duces its mobility. Indeed, in order for the price to move
to the new position all limit orders in the interval be-
tween the current and new values of the price must be
filled by market orders. If for one reason or the other the
price remained fairly constant for a prolonged period of
time, limit orders created during this time tend to fur-
ther trap the price in this region. This self-reinforcing
mechanism qualitatively explains the slow rate of price
change in our model. Unfortunately, the nontrivial Hurst
exponent H = 1/4 is a step in the wrong direction from
its random walk value HRW = 1/2. Indeed, the short
time Hurst exponent of real stock prices was measured
to be Hreal ≃ 0.6− 0.7.
The amplitude of price fluctuations in our model has
significant long range correlations. One natural mea-
sure of these correlations is the autocorrelation func-
tion of the absolute value of price increments Sabs(t) =
〈|p(t′+t+1)−p(t′+t)||p(t′+1)−p(t′)|〉t′ [6]. In our model
this quantity was measured to have a power law tail
Sabs(t) ∝ t
−1/2. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 where the
Fourier transform of Sabs(t) has a clear f
−1/2 form. The
exponent γ = 1/2 of Sabs(t) ∝ t
−γ in our model is not far
from γ = 0.3 measured in the S&P 500 stock index [6]. In
Fig. 2 we also show the Fourier transform of the autocor-
relation function of signs of price increments Ssign(t) =
〈sign[p(t′+t+1)−p(t′+t)]sign[p(t′+1)−p(t′)]〉t′ , which
has a white noise (frequency independent) form. This is
again, similar to the situation in real market, where signs
of price increments are known to have only short range
(< 30 min) correlations.
Finally, in Fig. 3 we present three histograms of price
increments p(t+ δt)− p(t) in our model, measured with
time lags δt = 1, 10, 100. The overall form of these his-
tograms is strongly non-Gaussian and is reminiscent of
the shape of such distribution for real stock prices. As
the time lag is increased the sharp maximum of the
distribution gradually softens, while its wings remain
strongly non-Gaussian. In the inset we show a log-log
plot of the histogram of p(t + 1) − p(t) (δt = 1) col-
lected during tstat = 3.5×10
7 timesteps (as compared to
tstat = 40000 for the data shown in the main panel) and
logarithmically binned. One can clearly distinguish two
power law regions separated by a sharp crossover around
p(t + 1)− p(t) ≃ 1. The exponents of these two regions
were measured to be 1+α1 = 0.6±0.1 and 1+α = 3±0.2.
The power law exponent 1 + α2 = 3 of the far tail lies
right at the borderline, separating the Pareto-Levy region
α < 2, where the distribution has an infinite second mo-
ment, from the Gaussian region. In any case, since price
fluctuations in our model were shown to have long range
correlations, one should not expect convergence of the
price fluctuations distribution to a universal Pareto-Levy
or Gaussian functional form as δt is increased. The exis-
tence of a similar power law to power law crossover was
reported in the distribution of stock price increments in
NYSE, albeit with different exponents 1+α1 ≃ 1.4−1.7,
and 1 + α2 ≃ 4− 4.5 [3]. The mechanism responsible for
this crossover in a real market is at present unclear.
In conclusion, we have introduced and numerically
studied a simple model of a limit order-driven market,
where agents randomly submit limit or market orders.
The execution price of new limit orders is set by offsetting
the current market price by a random amount. In spite
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of such strategy-less, mechanistic behavior of traders, the
price time series in our model exhibit a highly nontriv-
ial behavior characterized by long range correlations, fat
tails in the histogram of its increments, and a non-trivial
Hurst exponent. These results are in qualitative agree-
ment with empirically observed behavior of prices on real
stock markets. More work is required to try to modify
the rules of our model in order to make this agreement
more quantitative.
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FIG. 1. The price signal p(t) and its derivative
δp = p(t + 1) − p(t) as a function of time. The inset shows
the Fourier transform of the autocorrelation function of the
price signal. Solid line is a fit Sp(f) = f
−(1+2H) = f−3/2,
corresponding to the Hurst exponent H = 1/4.
FIG. 2. Fourier transforms of autocorrelation functions of
signs of price increments (×) and absolute values of price
increments (•) averaged over 700 realization of price record
218 ∼ 2.6× 105 time steps long.
FIG. 3. Histograms of price increments
p(t) = p(t+δt)−p(t) with time-lags δt = 1 (◦), 10 (•), and 100
(×). The inset shows the histogram of positive price incre-
ments p(t+1)−p(t) > 0 (negative increments have a virtually
indistinguishable hystogram) on a log-log plot. Power law fits
in two regions give exponents 1 + α1 = 0.6 and 1 + α = 3.
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